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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twefve years, the Burger Court has eviscerated fourth 
amendment protection of individual privacy by continually expanding 
poljce authority to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles. 1 That 
process reflects the Court's changing attitudes toward the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement for police intrusions conducted outside the 
home. 2 
Most recently, in Unz'ted States v. Ross ,3 the Supreme Court extended 
the automobile exception to the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment to closed containers found in lawfully stopped and searched vehi-
cles. Under the exception, police may conduct a warrantless search of a 
* John C. Hutchins Professor of Law and Director, Center for Criminal Justice, Case. 
Western Reserve University School of Law; J.D., Indiana University, 1963; A.B., Queens Col-
lege, 1959. The author is grateful for the able research assistance provided by Curtis 
Stranathan. 
1 Su generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not- A Rationale 
in Search tifa Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976); Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile 
Search: Exception Wzihout justzjicatzon , 32 HASTINGS L.J. 12 7 ( 1980); Nate, Drawing Lines A round 
the Fourth Amendment: Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton, 10 HoFSTRA L. REV. 
483 (1982); Note, Search Incident to Arrest and the Automobile Exceptzon~ 95 HARV. L. REV. 251 
(1981); Note, The Automobile Exceptzon to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Away From the Fourth 
Amendment, 82 W.VA. L. REV. 637 (1980). 
2 The Court has recognized that a different set of fourth amendment values are affected 
when an intrusion takes place in a public place rather than in a home. In 1976, the Court 
reaffirmed that a warrant is not necessary to effect an arrest that occurs in a public place 
irrespective of the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a 
warrant, or whether the suspect was about to flee. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 
(1976). Moreover, an arrest that is attempted in public cannot be thwarted by a suspect who 
retreats into a house. In that instance, the exigent circumstances pro.vided by "hot pursuit" 
permit the arresting officers to enter the house to complete the arrest. United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). Absent exigent circumstances, however, an arrest warrant is 
needed to enter a dwelling to arrest an occupant, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), 
and, absent exigent circumstance)i, a search warrant is needed to enter a dwelling to arrest a 
non-resident. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
3 United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
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vehicle when they have probable cause to believe that contraband or 
evidence of a crime m;;t.y be found inside the car.4 The Burger Court has· 
thus transformed a narrow and tightly drawn exception into a virtually 
limitless general rule. In so doing, the Court has demonstrated a grow-
ing preference for warrantless searches in public places. In Ross, the Jus-
tices abandoned precedent, for which the ink was hardly dry, leaving 
little more of the judicial preference for a warrant than a shibboleth to 
be incanted periodically while the warrant clause is systematically 
ignored. 
The Ross decision sought to clarify an ambiguous area of the law by 
restating and expanding the automobile exemption. In fact the Court 
went further, holding that the scope of a search under the automobile 
exception "is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legiti-
mately authorize by warrant."5 This statement provides the rationale 
underlying the Burger Court's repeated approval of broad warrantless 
searches even absent the conditions which gave rise to the exception. 
Moreover, despite its new bright-line rule, the decision leaves significant 
questions unanswered <J.nd may also signal the gradual creation of an 
entirely new and broader public place-probable cause exception to the 
warrant clause.6 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the Ross decision and its 
implications for related fourth amendment areas. It will also discuss the 
automobile exception, the broad scope of warrantless searches, and the 
possible emergence of a public place-probable cause exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
II. UNITED STATES V. Ross 
The case arose when District of Columbia police received a tele-
phone tip from a reliable informant that an individual known as "Ban-
dit" was selling narcotics out of a parked vehicle. 7 The informant 
advised the officers that he had just observed Bandit complete a narcot-
ics transaction and had been told by Bandit that additional narcotics 
4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
5 102S.Ct.at2172. 
6 This approach was rejected by the Court as recently as 1977. "We do not agree that 
the Warrant Clause protects only dwellings and other specifically designated locales.'' United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 7 (1976). "[A] fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate pri-
vacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the home." /d. at 
II (footnotes and citations omitted). "I think it somewhat 'unfortunate that the Government 
sought a reversal in this case primarily to vindicate an extreme view of the Fourth Amend-
ment that would restrict the protection of the Warrant Clause to private dwellings and a few 
other 'high privacy' areas." /d. at 17 (Blackmun, J, dissenting). 
7 102 S. Ct. at 2160. 
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were in the car's trunk. The informant described Bandit and the auto-
mobile.8 When the officers went to the scene, they observed a vehicle 
matching the informant's description. A computer check revealed that 
it was registered to Albert Ross, who fit the informant's description and 
was known to use the alias "Bandit." The officers saw the vehicle but no 
one matching Ross' description and they left the area to avoid alerting 
the suspect. 9 When they returned in five minutes, they saw the automo-
bile being driven from its parking spot. The officers pulled alongside, 
confirmed that the driver matched the informant's description, stopped 
the car and ordered the driver from the vehicle. The officers searched 
Ross, discovered a bullet on the front seat of the automobile and then 
searched the interior compartment of the vehicle, finding a gun in the 
glove compartment. Ross was arrested and handcuffed. 10 The officers 
took Ross' car keys and opened the trunk. There, they discovered two 
containers: a closed, but unsealed, brown paper bag and a zippered red 
leather pouch. In the paper bag, the officers found several glassine enve-
lopes containing white powder. The leather pouch was not disturbed. 
The paper bag was placed back in the trunk next to the zippered pouch 
and the vehicle vvas driven to police headquarters. 11 There, the car vvas 
subjected to a second search. The paper bag was removed and sent to 
the police laboratory, which later determined that the envelopes con-
tained heroin. The zippered pouch was opened and found to contain 
$3,200. 12 
The government charged Ross with possession of heroin with intent 
to distribute. 13 Having denied his suppression motion, the trial judge 
then admitted both the heroin and the money into evidence, and Ross 
was convicted. 14 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard the case 
twice, once in panel and again en bane, 15 spotlighting the uncertainty 
surrounding the automobile container cases. On both occasions, the 
court attempted to fit the case into the framework the Supreme Court 
created in Arkansas v. Sanders, 16 where a majority held that the automo-
bile exception is limited to the vehicle itself and does not extend to con-
tainers found in an automobile. The Court in Sanders approved a 
procedure by which a container discovered in a warrantless automobile 
8 Jd. 
9 !d. 
10 Jd. 
II fd. 
12 /d. 
13 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1972). 
14 102 S. Ct. a1 2160. 
15 655 F.~d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane). 
16 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
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search could be seized for safekeeping by police, who would then peti-
tion the court for a search warrant. 17 The Sanders Court reaffirmed sup-
port for the automobile exception but reasoned that none of the 
proferred justifications for the exception applied to closed containers 
within a vehicle. 
By the time Sanders was decided in 1979, application of the automo-
bile exception had already outstripped its original justifications, forcing 
the Court to develop new rationales for the constant e_&pansion of the 
warrant exemption. 18 None of those rationales, however, warranted ex-
pansion of the exception beyond the yehicle to its contents, and in Sand-
ers, the Court drew that constitutional line. Unfortunately, even this 
line provided inadequate guidance for future cases. The majority had 
indicated that not all containers were entitled to fourth amendment pro-
tection and suggested exclusion where the package fails to demonstrate 
an owner's expectation of privacy. 19 Clearly within this category were 
containers which are not closed and where the contents are open to 
"plain view;" similarly unprotected were containers whose contents are 
inferable from the outward packaging of the container. 20 But Justice 
Powell; the author of the Sanders majority opinion, implied that other 
containers fell outside the protection. 21 He predicted that it would be 
difficult to distinguish between containers which were entitled to the full 
protection of the warrant clause and those which were not. 22 Many 
lower courts interpreted Powell's oblique comment as presaging the de-
velopment of a "worthy container" rule,23 which Justice Powell alone 
17 This was the procedure already approved for containers found in a public place. See 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, II (1977). 
18 Su, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (after arrest of defendant and seizure of car, 
warrantless search of car upheld; Chambas used as authority for the decision with'out any 
reference to exigent circumstances, mobility, or the impracticability of obtaining a warrant); 
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (search of exterior of automobile parked in public lot 
allowed since defendant's attorney knew police were interested in automobile); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of automobile at police station reasonable 
since a warrantless search would have been reasonable at scene of arrest); see also South Da-
kota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (warrantless search of automobile towed after issu-
ance of two parking violations upheld as related to standard police caretaking procedure); 
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless search of car two and one-half hours 
after defendant was hospitalized and car towed to private lot upheld as incident to caretaking 
function of police). 
19 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.I3 (1979). 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 Lower courts, in fact, did have difficulty distinguishing which containers were worthy 
of the full protection of the warrant clause. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1174 n.3, 
1175 n.4 (Tamm, J., dissenting), for a comprehensive list of containers and types of containers 
defined as worthy by state and federal courts and a corresponding list of unworthy containers. 
Most courts seemed to draw the line at containers that were "luggage-like." /d. at 1176; see 
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advocated in his later concurring opinion in Robbzizs v. Cab]Orma .24 
A majority of the D.C. Circuit panel that first heard Ross followed 
Justice Powell's lead and applied a "worthy container" rule. The panel 
majority found a difference of constitutional magnitude between the 
leather pouch and paper bag uncovered in defendant's trunk and held 
that worthiness is to be determined by a container's likely contents. 25 
Although the contents could not be examined in order to determine 
whether the container might be searched without a warrant, the court 
said the nature of the contents could be divined from the outward quali-
ties of the container. 26 Judge Tamm, writing for the panel majority, 
reasoned that the protection of the rule is limited to containers which 
are likely repositories for intimate personal belongings; therefore the un-
sealed paper bag might be searched because it was not an appropriate 
repository for such possessions. 27 The panel ruled that the defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the paper bag once it was 
lawfully in the hands of the police because a paper bag is quite insub-
stantial, affording minimal protection against accidental and deliberate 
intrusions by the curious and dishonest. 28 On the other hand, Judge 
Tarnm distinguished the pouch as a form of luggage representing a 
"personal sanctuary"; the reasonable person would view it as an appro-
priate repository for intimate personal possessions, thereby manifesting a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and worthy of the full protection of 
the warrant clause. 29 Presumably, if the Supreme Court had adopted a 
"worthy container" rule, the line drawn at the paper bag by Judge 
Tamm, though attacked as "acute ethnocentric myopia,"30 was as sound 
also United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1981),cat. dmitd, 102 S. Ct. 3493 (1982); 
Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981). Even after Robbins, however, courts 
exempted paper bags from the warrant requirement when discovered during search of a car; 
su State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d I (Iowa 1982) (warrantless search of paper bag found in 
locked automobile trunk upheld under CoTTo!/ doctrine); State v. Anderson, 316 N.W.2d 105 
(S.D. 1982) (search of smali film canister upheld as an unworthy container, relying upon the 
absence of a clear majority in Robbins); ScY also Note, rVaTTant/ess Container Searches Under th,· 
Automobz!t and Search fnczdent Exceptzons, 9 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 185, at 197-214 (1980); Note, 
Drawing Lines Around thl" Fourth Amendment: Robbins v. Califomza and N,·w York v. Belton, I 0 HoF-
STRA L.j. 483 (1982). 
24 453 U.S. 420 at 429, 434 n.3 (1981) (Powell,]., concurring). 
2" United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. (D.C. Cir. April 17, 1980), as amended May 
6, 1980, rev'd 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane). The panel majority's position is set 
forth by its author in Judge Tamm's dissent from the en bane decision. 655 F.2d at 1171. 
26 Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op; see also 655 F.2d at 1171-80 (Tamm, J., dissenting). 
27 Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. 
28 Jd. 
29 Jd. 
30 United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 13 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dissent), quoting .from 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 775 ( 1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Jus-
tice Stewart's plurality opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (198 !). "What one 
person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag." /d. at 426. Justice 
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as one could find. Judge Tamm did not find it easy to defend the "wor-
thy container" rule but apparently inferred from Justice Powell's opin-
ion in Sanders that the Supreme Court intended to subscribe to such a 
rule, 31 
A "worthy container" rule hardly provides a meaningful theoreti-
cal framework, let alone functional standards, for courts to distinguish 
that which is constitutionally protected from that which is not. Such a 
rule would significantly increase the unpredictability of fourth amend-
ment litigation, where complaints of unpredictability already abound. 
Moreover, the panel also was faced with the difficulty of determin-
ing in a vacuum the expectation of privacy in the container, without 
also considering the expectation of privacy in the place where the 
container is stored. While expectations ofprivacy are theoretically mea-
sured by the expectations of the reasonable person, that most fruitful 
avenue of inquiry was foreclosed from the panel's consideration.32 A 
reasonable person would likely assume that a container placed in a 
locked automobile trunk, while by no means as secure as leaving it at 
home in a locked closet or for that matter in a bank safe, sufficiently 
manifests an expectation of privacy to be worthy of constitutional pro-
tection. But the structure of inquiry was governed by the automobile 
exception to the warrant clause. At least from 1970 until Ross, the ex-
ception rested largely on the theory .that one who reveals his presence in 
public by riding in an automobile sacrifices a privacy interest in the 
entzre vehicle, including separate locked compartments.33 The Supreme 
Court in Arkansas v. Sanders 34 held that this loss of privacy did not carry 
beyond the vehicle itself, and that most closed containers were not sub-
ject to warrantless searches under the authority of the automobile excep-
Stevens seems to take great satisfaction that Ross will not discriminate on the basis of wealth, 
102 S. Ct. at 2171 & n.31. But Justice Marshall was not encouraged by such an equalizing 
result, since the distinction between the way rich and poor package their possessions is elimi-
nated by the loss of protection to both. !d. at 2182 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
31 Judge Tamm correctly inferred Justice Powell's intent about a worthy container rule 
generally and specifically with reference to a paper bag. Su Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 
at 434 n.3, where Justice Powell wrote, "[m]any others, varying from a plastic cup to the 
ubiquitous brown paper grocery sack, consistently lack [a reasonable expectation of privacy]." 
At the time, Judge Tamm had no way of knowing that no other Justice would subscribe to 
Justice Powell's worthy container doctrine. 
32 The Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979), clearly indicated that.the 
entire car may be subject to a warrantless sear~h, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364, 366 (1978) (glove co~partment); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (passenger com-
partment); Cady v. Dombwwski, 413 U.S. 433, 437 (1973) (trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 44 (1970) (co~~ealed compartment under dashboard); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 136 (1925) (b~hind the upholstery of the seats). 
33 Su United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12-13 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973). 
34 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
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tion. In reliance on Justice Powell's opinions in Sanders and Robbzizs, the 
panel majority in Ross drew constitutional distinctions based upon the 
size and substantiality of the containers' packaging.35 
The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc,36 rejected its panel majority's 
reading of Sanders and the "worthy container" rule. Instead, the en bane 
majority adopted the analysis proposed by Judge Bazelon, who had dis-
sented from the panel's conclusion.37 Writing for the majority, Judge 
Ginsburg concluded that: 
Sanders did not establish a "worthy con-tainer" rule encompassing bags of 
leather but not of paper. Rather, it appears to us that Sanders reaffirmed 
the Supreme Court's longstanding position regarding the centrality of the 
warrant requirement to Fourth Amendment administration: absent a "spe-
cifically established and well-delineated" _exception, a warrantless search is, 
per se impermissible. . . . 
No specific, well-delineated exception called to our atte11tion permits 
the police to dispense with a warrant to open and search "unworthy" con-
tainers. Moreover, we believe that a rule under which the validity of a 
warrantless search would turn on judgments about the durability of a 
container would impose an unreasonable and unmanageable burden on 
police and courts. For these reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment 
protects all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidiousness to 
place their effects in containers that decisionmakers would rank in the lug-
gage line, we hold that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for-
bids the warrantless opening of.a closed, opaque paper bag to the same 
extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a small unlocked suitcase 
or a zippered leather pouch.3B 
Three months later, a majority of the Supreme Court in Robbzizs v. 
California adhered to the position advanced in Sanders, and rejected ex-
tension of ~he automobile exception to a vehicle's contents.39 Six mem-
bers of the Robbzizs Court agreed that most closed containers found in a 
car are protected to the same extent as closed containers found else-
where, ruling that the justifications which gave rise to the automobile 
exception-mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy in ave-
hicle-are inapplicable to the contents of the vehicle.40 Therefore, the 
Court in Robbzizs held illegal the warrantless search of the bulky, taped, 
35 United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 14; see also 655 F.2d at 1177 (Tamm, J., 
dissenting). 
36 655 F.2d 1159 (1981) (en bane). Two of the three members of the panel did not sit on 
the en bane reconsideration of the panel decision in Ross. They were District Judge Harold 
Greene, who sat on the panel by designation and who concurred in Judge Tamm's panel 
opinion, and Senior Circuit Judge David Bazelon. 
37 Judge Bazelon's position was adopted in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion three 
months later in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426-27 (1981). 
38 655. F.2d at 1161 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
39 453 U.S. at 424-25, rt!lyzng upon Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) and United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977). 
40 453 U.S. at 424-25. 
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opaque packages found in the luggage compartment of the defendant's 
station wagon.41 But the majority could agree only on its refusal to ex-
tend the automobile exception; there was no other majority position in 
Robbzizs .42 
A plurality of four, represented by Justice Stewart, rejected the 
proposition that the warrant clause only protected containers likely to 
hold personal effects and noted that the constitutional protection ex-
tends to people and their effects, "whether they are 'personal' or 'imper-
sonal.' "43 According to Justice Stewart, the fourth amendment 
guarantee attaches because items are placed in closed, opaque contain-
ers.44 Justice Stewart also rejected the "worthy container" rule, thus pro-
P?sing constitutional protection for all but the two categories 
specifically excluded by the Sanders Court-items that are in plain view 
or those whose packaging announces their contents.45 
The other two votes for reversal in Robbzns were cast by Justice 
Powell, who wrote a separate concurring opinion,46 and Chief Justice 
Burger, who voted with the majority but concurred in neither of the 
written opinions.47 Justice Powell confirmed that Judge Tamm had in-
terpreted his Sanders opinion correctly by advocating a "worthy 
container" rule. He rejected both the plurality's bright-line rule ex-
tending fourth amendment protection to all but the specifically ex-
cluded containers48 and the dissent's bright-line rule extending the 
automobile exception to all containers found in any lawfully stopped 
and searched vehicle.49 At the same time, Justice Powell was attracted 
to the dissent's advocacy of an expanded automobile exception as a way 
of providing agreement for a majority of the Court on an issue that had 
provoked incessant litigation. 5° This attraction increased and ultimately 
led him to switch his position in Ross .51 
In Sanders, Chief Justice Burger had concurred with the majority 
but did not think it necessary in that case to decide whether the automo-
41 !d. at 428-29. 
42 Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion in which 
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined. Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in 
the judgment. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without a written opinion. 
Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. 
43 453 U.S. at 426. 
44 !d. 
45 !d. at 427. 
46 !d. at 429. 
47 !d. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. at 435~ 
50 !d. 
51 102S.Ct.at2173. 
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bile exception applied to the contents of a vehicle. 52 His silent vote in 
Robbzm was evidence that he had resolved this question against expan-
sion of the automobile exception. 5 3 His contradictory vote in Ross less 
than a year later was again unaccompanied by any separate statement 
explaining his reasoning or his apparent self-reversal. In Ross, the Chief 
Justice joined in the majority opinion, which was a restatement of the 
dissent against which he had voted in Robbzm .54 
The inability of the Robbzns majority to present a unified theory in 
support of its decision set the stage for the reconsideration of the issue 
the following term in Unzted States v. Ross. 55 The absence of a clear ma-
jority position was compounded by other factors. First, Justice Stewart, 
the author of the plurality position and one of the principal advocates of 
strict limitations upon exceptions to the ·warrant requirement, retired at 
the end of the term, days after delivering his opinions in Robbzns and its 
companion case, New York v. Belton .56 Second, Justice Powell's "worthi-
ness" evaluation was clearly unacceptable to the rest of the Court. 
Moreover, Powell himself had expressed growing discomfort with the 
uncertainty in this area, which ultimately led him to approve the dis-
senters' bright-line ruleY Finally, Justice Stevens, who in seven years 
on the Court had rejected bright-line rules on fourth amendment issues 
in favor of strict limitations on exceptions to the warrant requirement,58 
52 442 U.S. at 766-67. 
53 But see State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d 911, 915-16 (La. 1981), where the Louisiana 
Supreme Court interpreted the Chief Justice's silent concurrence in Robbins as a reiteration of 
the point he raised in Sanders. Nothing in the Robbins facts, however, justified the Louisiana 
court's conclusion. In Robbzns, probable cause focused on the entire car. The police were not 
aware of the defendant or his packages before the car was stopped on the highway. 
54 102 S. Ct. at 2159-73. 
55 The Court granted certiorari as soon as it reconvened in October, 1981, and directed 
the parties to brief whether the decision in Robbzns should be reconsidered. 102 S. Ct. 386 
(1981). 
56 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Justice Stewart's opinions in Robbzns and Belton were not para-
digms of consistency. Although he concurred in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54-55 
(1970), he would not have reached the issue of the search. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 433 (1971), he argued for a much narrower automobile exception. In Texas v. 
White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam), he voted with the majority and seemed to accept the 
greatly expanded exception. See gen~tra!ly Lewis,Justzce Stewart and Fourth Amendment Probable 
Cause: "Swing Voter"orPartzCipantina "New.Majority'?, 22 LOY. L. REV. 713 (1976). InRob-
bzns, Justice Stewast argued against expansion of the automobile exception, but in Belton he 
wrote the majority opinion allowing the broadest latitude for the exemption of incidental 
searches when the site of an arrest is an automobile. 
57 453 U.S. at 430, 435. The role that the Chief Justice had carved out for himself in the 
resolution of this issue must have been !mown to the other Justices who participated in the 
Robbzns conference discussion; only they were privy to his uncertainty or lack of commitment 
to the result in that case. · 
58 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 115 (1977) (Stevens, J, dissenting); see 
also Amsterdam, Perspectzves 011 the Fourth Amendmerzt, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403-04 (1974) 
(fourth amendment should speak to police and speak to them intelligibly). 
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indicated in his Robbins dissent that these principles were inapplicable 
when considering automobiles.59 
Facilitated by one retirement and two vote changes, six Justices 
were thus able to coalesce around the views of Justice Stevens to pro-
duce a majority opinion in "this troubled area."60 The Ross Court held 
that a warrantless search under the automobile exception, where police 
have legitimately stopped an automobile and have probable cause to 
believe that contraband is concealed within it may be "as thorough as a 
magistrate could· authorize in a warrant 'particularly describing the 
place to be searched.' "6l 
Justice Stevens reviewed the origins of the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement. The exception was created in Carroll v. Unzted 
States 62 as a response to the impracticability of securing a warrant in 
cases involving the transportation of contraband goods. The Court has 
repeatedly rejected an alternative Justice Harlan proposed after Carroll 
in Chambers v. Maroney ,63 that would have required police first to seize the 
vehicle and then obtain a_warrant before conducting a search. In Ross, 
Justice Stevens restated in a footnote the Court's reasoning for rejecting 
the Harlan approach;64 he also sought to explain why the Court had 
approved warrantless searches where automobiles have already been 
seized, are safely in police custody, and where the security of the evi-
dence is no longer at risk. The decision to expand the exception, he 
contended, was based on the "practicalities of the situations presented 
and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a con-
trary rule would provide for privacy interests."65 According to Justice 
Stevens, the Court has refused to require the posting of a guard or the 
towing of the vehicle because the privacy interest of the occupants has 
already been intruded upon by the stopping.66 Moreover, he suggested 
that such a rule would often leave the car's occupants stranded on the 
highway while the car was seized.67 Justice Stevens stressed that the ex-
ception is only available where objective facts would justify issuance. of a 
warrant by a magistrate "and not merely on the subjective good faith of 
the police officers. "68 
59 453 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
6o 102 S. Ct. at 2168. 
61 /d. at 2159. 
62 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
63 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 61-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
64 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9. 
65 /d. 
66 /d. 
67 /d. Judge Wilkey originally offered this line of reasoning when the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia heard the case. Su 655 F.2d at 1196-99 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
68 102 S. Ct. at 2164. This brief reference to the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule is not likely to be dispositive of the issue. Su United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th 
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The automobile exception which the Burger Court inherited was 
limited and carefully drawn. It recognized that the mobility of a vehicle 
would create, in certain circumstances, an exigency which would allow 
police officers, who lawfully stopped a vehicle upon a highway, to con-
duct an immediate search without first obtaining judicial permission. 
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement, devised by Chief 
Justice Taft in Carroll,69 recognized the existence of a'n emergency situa-
tion where police, having probable cause to believe that evidence would 
be found in a vehicle, would lose the opportunity to search for and seize 
the evidence if forced to delay the search while a warrant was sought 
and the automobile was driven away. The exception was limited only 
to those situations where the delay caused by recourse to a judge or 
magistrate created the potential of forever denying to police the oppor-
tunity to recover contraband or evidence of a crime. h was thus reason-
able for police to enter and search the vehicle without ·prior judicial 
permission because the alternative actually would have frustrated legiti-
mate law enforcement purposes. 70 There was no prior arrest in Carroll 
which would have immobilized the occupants of the vehicle and pre-
vented thern fr-orn reiT1oving the car* 71 The actual mobility of the partic-
ular automobile constituted the exceptional circumstance which 
provided the excuse for bypassing the warrant process. 
The Ross Court claimed that Chief Justice Taft's failure to consider 
a temporary seizure of the vehicle serves as the basis for a broader read-
ing of the Carroll rule. 72 In both cases, however, the police clearly could 
have temporarily seized the car while they petitioned for a warrant. 73 
The occupants of the vehicle, not then under arrest, would have been 
displaced arid inconvenienced, but their privacy interest in the vehicle, 
Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. dem<·d, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), where 13 out of 24 judges sitting en 
bane held that evidence is not to be suppressed under. the exclusionary rule when officers 
discover it in the course of actions that an~ taken in good faith (!nd in the reasonable, though 
mistaken, belief that they are authorized. Jd at 846-4 7; su also Mertens and Wasserstrom, 
Foreword· The Good Fazih Exception to the Exclusiona'J' Rule: Deregulati11g the Police a11d Derailrng the 
Law, 70 Geo. L.J. 365 (1981). The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in 11/rnois v. 
Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749,403 N.E.2d 77 (1980),ajj'd, 85 IIL2d 376,423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), 
cert. gra11ted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982), restored to calmdar )Or reargummt, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1983), in 
which the Court directed the parties to argue the issue of the good faith exception. 
69 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
70 !d. at 153; 102 S. Ct. at 2163. 
71 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Justice Marshall raised this point in his dissent when he argued 
that it is not always impracticable to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile. 102 
S. Ct. at 2178 n.6 and accompanying text, citzng 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE 511 (1978 
& Supp. 1982). But see also 655 F.2d at 1196-1200 Oudge Wilkey analyzes and emphasizes 
this point). 
72 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9; see also id. at 2178-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
73 !d. at 2178; see also Katz, Automobile Searches a11d Dzrmnzshed Expectatzims zn the TParra11t 
Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 567 (1982). 
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while interrupted, would not have been nullified by police acting with-
out judicial authorization. The Court in Carroll never considered this 
possibility, and the Burger Court has rejected it. 74 T!Ie latter has been 
unwilling to categorize seizure of a vehicle as significantly less an intru-
sion upon the protected privacy interest, although the Court does con-
sider temporary seizures in other contexts a preferable and lesser 
intrusion. 75 In Ross, Justice Stevens attributed great significance to the 
Carroll Court's failure to consider a temporary seizure as a substitute for 
the immediate search. That omission formed part of the basis for Jus-
tice Steven's broader rule and allowed him to abandon the "actual mo-
bility" rationale for the exception. 
At the time of the Carroll decision, the privacy rationale was largely 
undeveloped as the basis of fourth amendment protection. The Court 
had not yet focused upon varying privacy interests, nor upon the need to 
minimize sanctioned intrusions. Justice Stevens suggested that a 
"seizure pending warrant" rule would often leave motorists stranded on 
the highway while their automobile was removed for safekeeping. 76 
This solicitude for stranded motorists is incredible, particularly when 
offered as a revisionist basis for the Carroll decision by a Supreme Court 
which extended the exception to cases where motorists are arrested or 
otherwise incapacitated and where it is not necessary to conduct an im-
mediate search. 77 In none of the cases in which the Burger Court has 
extended the automobile exception is such solicitude appropriate; in all 
of those cases, the occupants of the vehicles were already in police cus-
tody and thus were unlikely to be inconvenienced by removal of their 
car pending a search warrant. 78 As Justice Harlan suggested in 1970,79 
even if the case should arise where a motorist is terribly inconvenienced 
by recourse to the warrant procedure, he can waive a warrant and con-
sent to a search.ao 
74 United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 
(1970). 
75 See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), where the Court acknowledged 
the differences between a search and a seizu.re of a mailed package en route. The Court held 
the temporary seizure adequately protected the· defendant's privacy interest, but that any 
further intrusion on that interest required a magistrate's approval. 
76 See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1196-1200 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), where this 
proposition was first advanced. 
77 The privacy rationale was not as sophisticated in 1925 and the concept of varying pri-
vacy interests had not been developed. 
78 E.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 
(1980); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Su W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, at 512-19. 
79 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 61-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
BO Perhaps this type of consent would confront an occasional motorist with a Hobson's 
choice, but the Court has not deemed such choices unpalatable when involving other consti-
tutional rights, provided that the individual retains control over the course of events. Su, e.g., 
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Having reaffirmed the unassailability of the automobile exception, 
the Court began the task of reversing the holding in Robbzns by ex-
tending the exception to the contents of lawfully searched vehicles. 81 
The Robbzns /Sanders standard dictated that courts consider the vehicle 
and its contents separately when determining the necessity for a war-
rant. In both cases, the Court concluded that the reasoning which un-
derlies the warrantless search of a vehicle was inapplicable to its 
contents, and that no independent justification for bypassing a warrant 
could be fashioned. However in Ross, the Court rejected this frame-
work. It was sufficient, according to Justice Stevens, that the search 
which turned up the container was itself exempted from the warrant 
requirement; no separate justification need be made for a warrantless 
search of the container.82 Consequently, the scope of a warrantless 
search authorized by the automobile exception, Justice Stevens wrote, is 
as broad as a search conducted with a warrant.83 Under this approach, 
the exception that allows the warrantless intrusion is equated with a 
warrant. It secures entry for the police officer and does not circumscribe 
the scope of the subsequent search. The only limitation on a search 
under the automobile exception, like the limitation of a search con-
ducted pursuant t~ a warrant, is defined by the object of the search. 
The authorization to search extends to the entire automobile, as well as 
to any container within the automobile which may house the object that 
is sought.84 
Ill. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION AFTER Ross 
The automobile exception stands now as a general exception to the 
warrant requirement.85 During the years of the exception's uncon-
trolled growth, the high Court has failed to develop a rationale to justify 
the exception's current dimensions, nor has the Court explained its vast 
departure from established fourth amendment doctrine. As the scope of 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982), where the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, held 
that "overreaching" is an overly expansive standard for application of the double jeopardy 
clause following a mistrial resulting from the defendant's own motion. Thus, where 
prosecutorial misconduct arises, counsel for th'e defense is faced with the choice between a 
·possibly prejudiced jury or waiver of his client's right to a verdict from that jury. 
8t 102 S. Ct. at 2169. 
82 /d. at 2172. 
83 /d. 
84 /d. 
85 United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). As Professor Kamisar has recently noted, 
the Court adopted the principle, if not the language, of the Government's argument that the 
automobile exception is the "functional equivalent of a warrant to search an automobile." 
See Kamisar, United States v. Ross: The Court Takes Another Loolr at the Contazner-in-the-Car Szlua-
tzim, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-82 (4th ed. 1983) (to be 
published in 1983). 
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the automobile exception has incrementally grown, fundamental fourth 
amendment principles have been cast aside in favor of transient rules.86 
In turn, these new rules have also given way with each new factual 
deviation. In the name of law enforcement expedience, the Court has 
endorsed each of these extensions, mocking basic fourth amendment ju-
risprudence to such a great degree that the current automobile excep-
tion, despite the Court's protests to the contrary, effectively undermines 
all applications of the warrant requirement.87 
The Supreme Court has said consistently that the fourth amend-
ment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures mandates 
"that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable .... "88 This 
statement reflects the view that a system that interposes a neutral judi-
cial officer between citizens and police best protects the privacy interests 
of Americans. The Court's premise has been that in order to be effec-
tive, the fourth. amendment must operate b(':fore the intrusion is com-
plete, when the protection is prophylactic rather than corrective.89 
Reasonableness is to be determined in. the first instance by compliance 
with the demands of the warrant clause. 
This traditional analysis demands that the warrant requirement be 
excused only when the cost to society resulting from the delay is great 
and jeopardizes legitimate societal interests. For example; a warrantless 
search is permissible if the delay. may seriously jeopardize society's op-
portunity to conduct the search at all or if it may in any way endanger 
the safety of law enforcement officers. The burden rests upon the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the intrusion fits within "a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant require-
ment.90 In the past, the Supreme Court did not look upon the warrant 
requirement as a formality designed to be waived at the mere spectre of 
police inconvenience. In fact, in McDonald v. Unzted States ,91 the Court 
indicated that the state must show "some grave emergency"92 before it 
may bypass the shield which the fourth amendment erects between a 
citizen and the police. Moreover, in McDonald, the Court said that po-
lice inconvenience does not constitute such an emergency. Those situa-
tions which satisfy the "grave emergency" test have been "jealously and 
86 Sa infra Part IV. 
87 Su infta Part V. 
88 Katz v. United. States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); sa also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 390 (1978). 
89 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965) (search warrant); Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (arrest warrant). 
90 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357. 
91 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
92 !d. at 455. 
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carefully drawn" to ensure that the exceptions do not become the gen-
. era! rule and are 'justified by absolute necessity. "93 
As the Court has observed, the warrant requirement does not com-
mit protection of privacy to the discretion of "zealous officers" who are 
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. "94 
The amendment does not seek to deny police opportunities to search for 
criminal evidence, but simply requires that a magistrate prescreen cer-
tain police activities to ensure that individual privacy is not unreasona-
bly invaded.95 Thus, the warrant process provides an objective 
determination of probable cause coupled with reasonable limitations on 
the scope of intrusions, rather than placing total reliance for the protec-
tion of privacy on an after-the-fact suppression process which is "too 
likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight 
judgment. "96 
From 1925 until 1970, the automobile exception ~as confined to 
searching vehicles whose occupants were not under arrest. There was no 
pressure for its expansion because most automobile searches followed 
arrests, and the scope of searches incident to arrest was then virtually 
limitless;97 Thus the automobile exception was rarely invoked. How-
93 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455 (1948);Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-
15 (1948). Attempting to limit warrantless intrusions through the judicial preference for a 
warrant is consonant with the intent of the framers of the amendment. Though not faced 
with the plethora of warrantless searches found in modern America, the framers were highly 
suspicious of official incursions into individual privacy not subject to prior judicial review. 
For a recent discussion of the historicar background and circumstances which led to the 
fourth amendment, see Grano, RdhznJczng the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requzrement, 19 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 603, 617-20 (1982). 
In colonial times warrantless searches, except for those incident to arrest, were unknown 
and unauthorized under English law. The warrant requirement suited the temper of the 
colonists whose privacy the colonial authorities had systematically invaded. By imposing an 
independent judiciary between law enforcement officers and the people and requiring war-
rants with adequate particularization supported by probable cause, the framers conformed 
the rules to their vision of a society in which individual rights would be protected. /d. 
94 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 
95 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948). 
96 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,96 (1964). Although developed largely through rhetoric, the 
preference for a warrant evolved not without action. The Court indicated that in a close case 
where reasonable appellate judges might differ on whether the facts constituted probable 
cause, "a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall." 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965). Even if the court did not always follow 
through with the promise implied in Ventruca, see, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), it was engaged in the process of educat-
ing lawyers and law enforcement officers that the Constitution, absent exceptional circum-
stances, sa Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), required a warrant. Delineation 
of the exceptions was cautious, extending only as far as necessary to accomplish the limited, 
but substantial, societal needs that underlay and generated the creation of an exception. 
97 See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938), cited by Justice Stevens in Ross to 
support his application of the Carroll doctrine. 102 S. Ct. at 2169. However, in Scher; the 
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ever, when the Supreme Court reviewed the scope of searches incident 
to arrest in Chime! v. Califomza ,98 it reduced their range to the area within 
the reaching or grabbing distance of the arrestee. Once the driver of a 
vehicle was arrested and removed from the automobile, he was no 
longer within reaching distance of objects within the vehicle.99 The au-
tomobile exception reemerged as a device to allow police to conduct 
warrantless searches of vehicles following an arrest, assuming there is 
independent probable cause to conduct a search. 
One year after the end of the Warren era, the Court abandoned 
mobility as the sine qua non for warrantless searches of vehicles, eliminat-
ing that factor which had allowed the Carroll Court to categorize as ex-
ceptional the circumstances which necessitated an immediate search in 
that case. in Chambers v. Maroney, 100 the vehicle was stopped and its oc-
cupants arrested. Just one year earlier, a search of the vehicle would 
have been upheld as incident to the arrest of the car's occupants. With 
that channel now closed by the standard imposed in Chzmel, the Court 
looked to the automobile exception for justification of the warrantless 
search. The only problem was that the critical test relied upon by the 
Carroll Court-that an immediate search was necessary to prevent losing 
the opportunity-would not have authorized the warrantless intrusion 
in Chambers. After groping for a rationale, the Court concluded that a 
car on the highway, though under police control, is always mobile. 101 
The Chambers rationale, however, promised still broader application of 
defendant was onder arrest btfore the search took place and, in deciding the case, the Court 
used both the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest rationale to justify the 
search. 305 U.S. at 255. 
98 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
99 Nevertheless, some courts continued to use search incident to arrest as a rationale for 
upholding warrantless searches of an automobile after the arrestee was out of the car and in 
police custody. For example, the New York courts, prior to the decision in Bellon, followed 
such a course. Su, t:.g., People v. McDonald, 61 A.D.2d 1081, 403 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1978) (up-
holding an automobile search by officer driving defendant's car to station while defendant 
transported in police car); People v. Abramowitz, 58 A.D.2d 921, 396 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1976) 
(rriem.) (upholding as incident to arrest two searches ofleather bag found behind driver's seat, 
after defendant out of car); People v. Cofield, 55 A.D.2d 113, 389 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1976), affd 
mem., 43 N.Y.2d 654, 371 N.E.2d 533, 400 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1977) (although search justified 
under automobile exception, court relied on Chimd, upholding search because "the maximum 
intrusion--detention of the individual-had already taken place"); People v. Goldstein, 60 
Misc. 2d 745, 304 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (upholding search of glove compartment as 
incident to an arrest when an officer was driving the car to the police station, even though the 
arrestee was in a different car and in the custody of another officer). 
Professor LaFave has cataloged the reluctance of some courts to apply the Chimd stan-
dards in his treatise. See W. LAFAVE, supra .note 71, at 413-19, 499-506. 
100 399 u.s. 42 (1970). 
101 !d. at 51; su also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 440 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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the Carroll exception to cars in poli~e custody even after they are re-
moved from the highway. 
The result of the Court's holding in Chambers was to legitimize a 
warrantless search where there was no conceivable need for police to 
proceed without first obtaining a warrant. When the Court approved 
warrantless searches of automobiles in pol.ice custody, securely immobi-
lized and removed to the police station, solely for the sake of police con-
venience, it strained theoretical justifications for the automobile 
exception. 
The Court could have achieved the same result in Chambers with a 
limited rule permitting warrantless searches of vehicles stopped on the 
highway when there is probable cause to conduct a search. In addition, 
such a rule could have countenanced searches conducted away from the 
highway where a search at the scene is demonstrably unsafe. 102 Even 
this rule, however, would have marked a significant devi~tion from Car-
roll. Instead, the Chambers Court fashioned a rule to allow police officers 
with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene or later at the 
police station in the absence of both a warrant and exigent circum-
stances.103· The mobility of the automobile lost ali significance when the 
Court adopted a general exception applicable even to those vehicles "in 
which the possibilities of the vehicle's being removed or evidence in it 
destroyed were . . . non-existent." 104 
The Court ~ubstituted a rationale based upon the diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in the automobile. 105 It reasoned that the privacy 
expectation of a person who reveals himself to public view by occupying 
an automobile is necessarily reduced. In addition, the Court considered 
the fact that a vehicle is primarily used for transportation rather than as 
a repository for personal effects, and that government extensively regu-
lates its use. 106 The Court has never explained convincingly how this 
reasoning supports searc~es of separate locked compartments or of ob-
jects which are not in plain view and are stored in the recesses of a vehi-
cle. Moreover, it completely contradicts the principle recognized by the 
102 In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 n. 10, the Court recognized that police safety 
deserved special consideration: 
It was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the station house. All occu-
pants in the car were arrested in ~ dark parking lot in the middle of the night. A careful 
search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers, and it would 
serve the owner's convenience and the safety of his car to have the vehicle and the keys 
together at the station house. 
103 Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (per curiam). 
104 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973). 
105 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-66 (1979); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 
590-91 (1974). 
106 Sa Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 424; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-63 
(1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 590. 
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Court that one demonstrates an expectation of privacy by exerting cau-
tion and removing conduct and effects from public scrutiny. 107 
The majority in Ross peremptorily abandoned the privacy rationale 
as the theoretical linchpin of the expanded automobile exception. In-
stead, Justice Stevens returned to Carroll and argued that the exception 
has always rested upon the impracticability of requiring a warrant for 
the search of automobiles. 108 The Court cited language in the Carroll 
opinion purportedly demonstrating that impracticability is the basis of 
the exception and that, to goods in transport, the exception is as old as 
the fourth amendment itself. 109 The Carroll language pertaining to im-
practicability, however, does not support a general rule allowing war-
rantless searches when an immediate search is unnecessary and a 
warrant could be practicably obtained. Chief Justice Taft's discussion 
of practicability was inextricably linked to his discussion of mobility and 
the search for objects which could be "put out of reach of a search war-
rant. " 110 He was particularly concerned with the search in .which "it is 
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly 
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be 
sought. " 111 The Taft opinion was limited to situations where the oppor-
tunity to seize evidence would be thwarted if a warrantless search could 
not be conducted. 
Under the vague rubric of"impracticability," 112 the Court has thus 
created a general exemption, despite the overwhelming number of situa-
tions in which the warrant requirement imposes no great burden upon 
police and frustrates no legitimate law enforcement objective. The au-
tomobile exception repudiates a central teaching of the fourth amend-
ment that police inconvenience does not justify bypassing the 
constitutional warrant requirement. 113 Moreover, the Court has not 
even limited the exemption to situations where police could demonstrate 
that the warrant requirement posed f1 serious inconvenience. Instead, 
the Court has created a blanket exemption covering, as well, those cases 
where recourse to a warrant imposes no inconvenience other than that 
intended under the fourth amendment. Finally, and perhaps most trag-
107 "But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). 
108 102 S. Ct. at 2169-70; cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761-66 (1979). 
109 Su Grano, supra note 93, at 617-20. 
110 United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925). 
Ill /d. at 153. 
112 The Court has succumbed to Justice Rehnquist's argument that requiring a warrant 
imposes frustrating burdens on law enforcement agencies in the "sparcely populated 'cow 
counties' located in some of the southern and western states" where "the nearest magistrate 
may be 25 or even 50 miles away." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 438-39 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
113 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948). 
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ically, the Court made no effort to demonstrate that requiring a warrant 
prior to the search of either an immobilized vehicle or the containers 
found within the vehicle frustrates legitimate law enforcement objec-
tives. Rather, the Court has simply devised a general rule which dimin-
ishes constitutional protection and enhances unchecked police 
discretion. 
Ross' extension of the automobile exception to containers found in a 
lawfully searched vehicle proved a more difficult hurdle. That barrier 
existed because the Court's rationale for the automobile exception does 
not remotely apply to closed, opaque containers discovered in an auto-
mobile. Containers seized outside automobiles may be held but may 
not be searched until judicial authorization is obtained. Containers hid-
den in a vehicle would rea·sonably fall" within the rationale of this rule 
and not be subject to an exception resting upon a dimin.ished expecta-
tion of privacy in vehides. 114 Moreover, the inconvenience justification 
associated with towing and securing a vehicle does not extend to a pack-
age found in the car. There is simply no greater inconvenience involved 
in transporting and securing a container seized from an automobile 
than one found anywhere else. 
Justice Stevens, in Ross, did not attempt to construct an independ-
ent justification for the search of containers found in an automobile. 
Instead, the Court held that an officer who has probable cause to con-
duct a warrantless search of an automobile may, as a matter of course, 
search the entire vehicle and any container found within the vehicle 
that may house the sought-after object. 11 " Thus, the search of con-
tainers flows automatically from the automobile exception. This ap-
proach will, in the long run, be more pervasively destructive of the 
warrant requirement than any strained necessity argument would have 
been. 116 It equates the scope of a warrantless search, at least one accom-
panied by probable cause, to a search undertaken with a warrant. It 
extends the scope of such searches beyond what was necessary to fulfill 
the societal objectives which gave rise to the exemption from the war-
rant requirement. 
According to Justice Stevens, the Carroll rationale supports the ex-
pansive view of the scope of warrantless searches. Once again, however, 
the Carroll opinion never focused on this issue. 117 There, the Court. up-
held the admissibility of contraband which was found only after the li-
114 The notion that one's privacy interest in an automobile is diminished because of the 
state's regulation of vehicles is inapplicable as well. &~ Katz, supra note 73, at 5 72 n.80. 
115 102 S. Ct. at 2172. 
116 See infta Part IV. 
II 7 See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text. 
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quor agents "opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery." 118 
From this, Justice Stevens assumed that the Court would have also au-
thorized a warrantless search if the agents had then encountered closed 
containers under or within the upliolstery. 119 The significant change in 
the law engineered in Ross rests only on this unsupported assumption. 
Having assumed that the Carroll exception applies to all vehicles 
and their contents, Justice Stevens reintroduced the privacy formula to 
fortify his conclusion. Just as an individual's interest in the privacy of 
his home must give way to a ·magistrate's warrant, "an individual's ex.-
pectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if 
probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contra-
band."120 Then Justice Stevens quite correctly concluded that the pri-
vacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment are no less than 
those in a movable container. However, the flaw in the argument is that 
the Carroll Court did not exempt all automobiles from the warrant re-
quirement. By starting with the diminished expectation of privacy in 
automobiles, the Burger Court expanded the Carroll exception to all ve-
hicles. But the Court has never successfully explained how that ration-
ale: absent a necessity to conduct a warrantless search, applied to the 
separate, locked compartments of immobilized vehicles. Now Justice 
Stevens has taken the exception full circle. He discarded the privacy 
rationale as the basis for the exception and used Carroll to support a 
broad general exemption never anticipated by the Carroll Court. He 
then concluded that the privacy interest presents no obstacle to ex-
tending the exception to closed containers. 
Treating the contents of a vehicle differently from the vehicle itself 
was certainly anomalous. The confusion, however, was not caused by 
Sanders or Robbins, which correctly applied traditional fourth amend-
ment doctrines. The unsupported and result-oriented growth of the au-
tomobile exception created the confusion and left no analytical 
structure with which to work out future cases. The majority opinion in 
Ross ends the confusion in the area of automobile searches and attempts 
to create a new analytical framework in which to resolve these questions, 
but it is a framework that requires a revisionist reading of the automo-
bile cases that preceded it. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the parame-
ters which the Court had developed for the consideration of warrantless 
searches. Not only has the Court finally succeeded in making the word 
"automobile" "a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment 
118 102 S. Ct. at 2169 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 136). 
11 9 102 S. Ct. at 2169. Justice Stevens went further and maintained that an opposite deci-
sion would have been "illogical." Similar support is found in the Chambers opinion where the 
evidence was found concealed in a compartment under the dashboard. 399 U.S. at 44. 
120 I 02 S. Ct. at 2171. 
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fades away and disappears," 121 but again has cast doubt upon the limits 
of warrantless searches and the need for warrants when intrusions occur 
m public places. 
IV. THE ScoPE oF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AFTER Ross 
Aside from its anomalous treatment of automobile searches, Ross 
promises to affect other fourth amendment issues. By merging the auto-
mobile and its contents and abandoning the effort to establish an in-
dependent exemption for searching receptacles contained in the vehicle, 
the Supreme Court was forced to offer a new analysis of the scope of 
warrantless searches generally and of automobile searches in particular. 
For more than a quarter of a century, warrantless intrusions were 
treated as extraordinary and subject to strict control. 122 . That control 
was exercised over the decision to make the initial intrusion as well as 
over the scope of that intrusion. 123 By requiring the law enforcement 
authority to justify the scope of the warrantless search as well as over 
the initial intrusion, the Court emphasized the extraordinary nature of 
these exceptions. 124 Relieving tl1e government from justifying the scope 
of its search strips the warrant requirement of half its protection. The 
abuses of power which led to the enactment of the fourth amendment 
involved not only entry by the Crown's representatives but the ran-
sacking that took place once entry had been accomplished. 125 Prior to 
Ross, warrantless searches were not considered an equally acceptable 
and broad alternative to searches with warrants. Such intrusions were 
sanctioned only when the costs of obtaining a warrant outweighed the 
121 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971). 
122 Ste supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
390-95 (1978). 
123 Set Israel, Cn~-nzTw/ ProccduJc) the Burgc_·r Court} and tlu: Lgac;' of the J-Varrcn Court l 75 Tv1JC:H. 
L. REv. 1319, 1388 & n.292 (!977). 
124 /d. 
125 An indication of the abuse which concerned the colonists was set forth in a declaration 
by a committee authorized by a town meeting in Boston to compile a list of "Infringements 
and Violations of Rights" in 1772: 
Thus our houses and even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes 
chests & trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man 
would venture to employ even as menial servants; whenever they are pleased to say they 
suspect there are in the house wares &c for which the dutys have not been paid. Fla-
grant instances of the wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in this 
and other Sea Port towns. By this we are cut off from that domestick securiiy which 
renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreable. Those Officers may 
under colour of law and the cloak of a general warrant [sic] break thro' the sacred rights 
of the Domicil, ransack mens houses, destroy their securities, carry off their property, and 
with little danger to themselves commit the most horred murders. 
B. SCHWARTZ, The Bi!! '!fRights: A Docummla1)' His/Of)' 206 (1971); sec also Grano, supra note 
93, at 618-20. 
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benefits attributable to the warrant process. 126 The possible permanent 
loss of evidence while a warrant is sought creates the type of necessity 
which will justify a warrantless search. Once the possibility of loss of the 
evidence is neutnilized, the necessity evaporates as should the authority 
to proceed further without judicial authorization. 127 
This analysis led to the result· in Robbzns . 128 The plurality con-
cluded that the reasons offered in support of the automobile exception 
were inapplicable to the vehicle's contents and found no independent 
justification for a warrantless search of the packages. 129 After the of-
ficers in Robbz'ns discovered and exercised control over the two packages, 
there could be no argument that it was necessary to conduct an immedi-
ate search. Moreover, an individual who has placed his effects in sealed, 
opaque containers has demonstrated an expectation of privacy meriting 
constitutional protection. There was no threat that the evidence would 
be lost, nor was it argued that it was impracticable to transport and 
safeguard the packages. As a general rule, there is a greater assurance 
that the entire contents of such packages will end up in the police prop-
erty room if the packages remain unopened until they are safely at the 
police station and then opened in accordance with a court directive. 
The Robbz'ns Court simply concluded that there were no exceptional cir-
cumstances to justify bypassing a warrant. 
But in Unzted States v. Ross ,130 the Supreme Court devised a new 
norm. While Justice Stewart, a year earlier in Robbz'ns, had required a 
showing of necessity for each step of the warrantless intrusion, 131 Justice 
Stevens for the Ross majority has chosen instead an approach which 
guarantees minimal judicial control over the scope of warrantless 
searches. The intrusion itself remains subject to the traditional inquiry 
and must fit within a "specifically established and well-delineated" ex-
ception,132 although the rigor of that inquiry will likely diminish now 
that the automobile exception is firmly anchored in nothing more than 
the "impracticability" of obtaining a warrant. Under the Ross doctrine, 
however, no link remains between the scope of the warrantless search 
and the exceptional nature of the warrantless intrusion. Once an excep-
tion permits the initial intrusion, the scope of the search is no more lim-
ited than a search with a warrant. 133 The scope of the search has no 
relationship to the objectives which justified the initial intrusion, and 
126 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979). 
127 Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 768 (1969). 
128 453 u.s. 420. 
129 453 U.S. at 425-26. 
130 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
131 453 U.S. at 428-29. 
132 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357. 
133 .102 S. Ct. at 2172. "The scope of a warrantless search thus is not defined by the nature 
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extends to any container which could house the object, whether or not 
there is any justification for searching the container without prior judi-
cial approval. 
Examination of the facts in Ross fails to disclose any cost to society 
had police merely seized the containers pending judicial authorization 
to search them. There was no risk that the evidence would have been 
lost to the police had the paper bag and zippered pouch remained 
closed until a warrant was issued. 134 The police were entitled to seize 
and protect the two containers. Because the defendant was already in 
custody, there would be no question of inconveniencing him while po-
lice waited for the warrant. Moreover, since the zippered pouch was not 
searched until it was removed to the police station, nothing was gained 
by bypassing the warrant. 135 
In short, abandonment of the traditional analysis in. favor of this 
expansive rule accomplishes nothing in Ross and similar cases to pro-
mote effective law enforcement. The rule alleviates the burdens associ-
ated with police having to obtain a warrant. But Ross involved no 
greater burden and inconvenience than normally is involved in ob-
taining a warrant; indeed, it is precisely the type of burden and incon-
venience that the fourth amendment intends. Instead, that burden has 
been alleviated without any suggestion that the corresponding diminu-
tion in constitutional protection will promote a significant social inter-
est. The substitution for the traditional analysis of a broad new rule can 
be viewed as evidence of the diminished importance accorded by this 
Court to the warrant process. The Court recognizes little inherent value 
in the prior determination of a judge or magistrate when it dictates that 
the warrant process must give way to mere inconvenience and defines 
the scope of warrantless searches to be the same as those conducted with 
a warrant. 136 
Two other decisions within the twelve months prior to Ross also 
involved broad definitions of the scope of warrantless searches. Both 
cases, Washington v. Chrisman 137 and lvew York v. Belton, 138 involved 
of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the 
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." !d. 
134 Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent that "the police succeeded in transporting 
the bag to the station without inadvertently. spilling its contents." 102 S. Ct. at 2178 & n.5. 
!35 By approving a search in which the warrant requirement could as easily have been 
fulfilled, the Court cast doubt upon its rule in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977). 
There the Court emphasized that a footlocker had not been opened until it was at the police 
station several hours after it was seized. The very factors which led to the result in Clwdwiclc, 
exclusivity of police control and delay, were present in Ross. 102 S. Ct. at 2160. 
!36 Sa, e.g., California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 921 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting 
from denial of stay). 
137 102 S. Ct. 812 (1982). 
t38 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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searches incident to arrest. That exception requires only that police of-
ficers have probable cause to believe that an arrestee had committed a 
crime. While neither of these decisions announced a rule comparable in 
scope to Ross, they are part of a similar pattern: It is far easier to under-
stand Belton and Chrzsman after the Ross opinion because all three up-
hold a broader search than the reasons supporting the exception to the 
warrant requirement would justify. 
In New York v. Belton, 139 a majority of the Court extended the scope 
of a search incident to arrest to the interior compartment of a vehicle 
and all containers found therein, following the arrest of an occupant of 
the vehicle. The Court severed the scope of incidental searches of a ve-
hicle from the reasons for excusing the warrant requirement following 
an arrest. Warrantless searchesincident to arrest are permitted to pro-
tect the police officer and to prevent the arrestee from destroying evi-
dence.140 Once it is assured that the arrestee cannot reach a weapon to 
threaten the officer's safety or gain access to evidence, those reasons dis-
appear. Any further intrusion does not ·protect the officer or the evi-
dence but serves the singular purpose of searching for evidence. 
Since Chzinel v. Galifomza, L41 searches incident to arrest were con-
fined to the area within the control of the arrestee. The genius of the 
"control" test is that it imposes a limitation upon the scope of incidental 
searches perfectly consistent with legitimate law enforcement needs 
without unduly sacrificing fourth amendment protection. Belton disre-
garded the principle that warrantless intrusions are extraordinary; in so 
doing, it implicitly foreshadowed the rule in Ross that an exception to 
the warrant requirement permits a virtually unlimited search. 
Waiver of the warrant requirement in Belton, as in Ross, did not 
promote essential law enforcement interests. Neither police possession of 
the evidence nor the opportunity to search would have been jeopardized 
if a warrant had been sought. 142 Further, the searches in Belton and Ross 
did not promote the policy reasons underlying the exceptions which au-
thorized search without a warrant. Neither the officer nor the evidence 
in Belton was endangered by the arrestees at the time the search was 
conducted; similarly, the search in Ross was not justified by the policies 
underlying the automobile exception. In both cases, once the receptacles 
139 /d. 
140 Sa United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973); Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762-63 (1969). Buts~~ United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (seizure of clothing 
from defendant 10 hours after entering jail did not violate fourth amendment). 
141 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
142 The officer in Belton, for instance, could have obtained a warrant. On remand, the New 
York Court of Appeals declined to follow the Supreme Court, relying upon the stat~ constitu-
tion. Instead, the New York court upheld the search under the automobile exception. People 
v. Belton; 55 N.Y.2d 49, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 432 N.E.2d 745 (1982). 
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were under exclusive police control, law enforcement objectives would 
not have been thwarted by recourse to a warrant. The result is a dimi-
nution of protection of fourth amendment interests without cognizable 
benefit. . 
Justice Stevens disagreed with the Belton majority's analysis of the 
broad scope of searches incident to arrest. He disagreed because any 
exception to the warrant requirement, under his analysis, supplants only 
the warrant require~ent and. hot the other prong of the fourth amend-
ment test. requiring the existence of probable cause to search. 143 Search 
incident to arrest, the exception relied upon in Belton, traditionally does 
not require probable cause to believe that evidence will be found. De-
spite their distinctive purposes, however, the Court treats the scope of 
the exceptions in an identical fashion. 144 
A similar theory upheld the intrusion in Washzizgto_n v. Chrzsman .145 
There, a state university police officer stopped the defendant's room-
mate who appeared to be under the age of twenty-one and carrying a 
half-gallon bottle of gin. 146 The officer accompanied the student to his 
dormitory room to retrieve identification. 147 The student entered the 
room while the officer remained in the open doorway where he could 
observe the student and the defendant, who was in the room when they 
arrived. 148 He observed the defendant, who appeared nervous at the 
sight of the officer, place a small box in a medicine cabinet. The officer 
also observed a small pipe and seeds, which he believed to be marijuana, 
on a desk within the room. Then the officer completed entry into the 
room and examined the pipe and seeds, confirming that the seeds were 
marijuana and observing that the pipe smelled of marijuana. 149 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, a majority held that a police 
officer has the right to remain literally at an arrestee's elbow and that it 
is not unreasonable under the fourth amendment for the officer to moni-
tor, "as his judgment dictates," the movement of an arrested person. 150 
The police officer did not testify that he entered, and examined the ma-
rijuana, because of fear that the original arrestee or the defendant could 
143 453 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
144 Justice Stevens may not be happy with the way Ross is being used. See United States v. 
Sharpe, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982) (mem.) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court remanded the case 
to the Fourth Circuit "for further consideration in light of United Stales v. Ross." I d. at 2951. 
Justice Stevens did not agree that Ross helped determine whether the warrantless search in 
question was supported by probable cause. ld. at 2952. 
145 102 S. Ct. 812 {1982). 
146 !d. at 815. 
147 !d. 
148 !d. 
149 ld. 
150 ld. at 817. 
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reach it and destroy it, nor because the item was perishable and might 
disappear while he was obtaining a warrant. Similarly, he never 
claimed that he entered the room to ensure his safety or to effectuate his 
control over the original arrestee. 151 The officer completed entry into 
the room and walked over to the desk solely to confirm his suspicion of 
the presence of marijuana. 15 2 
The Supreme Court majority was unconcerned with the total ab-
sence of a nexus between the reason for the additional intrusion and the 
underlying reasons that allow a warrantless search incident to arrest. 
The majority focused exclusively on the fact that the officer could have 
entered the room initially with the arrestee; it ignored the principle that 
the need for a search must be demonstrated at the moment the search 
takes place, regardless of what could have been done moments earlier. 
The Court held that the officer had not abandoned his right to be in the 
room whenever he deemed it essential, 153 although his determination 
that it was essential was entirely unrelated to the reasons which origi-
nally gave him legal access to the room and was not based upon a subse-
quently arising exigency. 
Ross, Belton and Chrisman constitute a watershed for the fourth 
amendment. The course that the Court has undertaken became clear 
only in Ross where Justice Stevens presented the bright-line rule defin-
ing the scope of searches under the automobile exception. Justice Ste-
vens' rationale for that nile is consistent with the Belton and Chrzsman 
decisions, despite his disagreement with the rule in Belton. All three 
mark a retreat from the principles set forth in Chzmel v. California; which 
required a close link· between the scope of warrantless searches and the 
underlying justification for the warrantless intrusion. Although the 
Court in Belton indicated continued support for the Chzmel doctrine, it 
eviscerated the doctrine when the scene of the arrest is a vehicle. Chrzs-
man in turn belies the suggestion that Chzmel principles would be eroded 
only in the context of automobile searc!J.es. 
A majority of today's Court concurs in supporting the broadest 
scope for warrantless searches, which it claims is based at least in part 
upon its "realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a 
contrary rule would provide for privacy interests." 154 This change is 
also based, again in part, upon the view that the importance accorded 
the fourth amendment by the Warren Court frustrates valid law en-
forcement interests. 155 It is uncertain whether this majority will prove 
151 /d. at 819 (White, J., dissenting). 
!52 /d. at 815, 819 (White, J., dissenting). 
153 /d. at 818. 
154 Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9. 
155 Although there is some risk in categorizing the Burger Court as one capable of forming 
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cohesive when Chadwzck and Sanders are reconsidered in light of the doc-
trine set forth in the three most recent cases. The ultimate test may 
prove to be a reconsideration of the actual holding in Chzme!, and limita-
tion of the rule to intrusions into homes. 156 
majorities to undermine fourth amendment interests and protections, see United States v. 
Steagald, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Israel, supra note 
123, at 1388, a body of case law exists which supports the argument that to read those cases 
any other way is to disregard the intent of the Justices who most often support the majority 
positions. The Court has limited the applicability of the exclusionary rule in proceedings that 
the Court contends would not further the underlying deterrent purpose of the rule. See Mich-
igan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Court has 
also developed a constricted notion of privacy, the fourth amendment litmus test, strained in 
its application to declare certain intrusions subject only to a reduced test of reasonableness or 
totally beyond any review. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-46 (1979); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. ;±35, 440-43 (1976); sec 
also, Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment, in I THE SUPREME CoURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOP-
M-ENTS 144 (1979), where Professor Kamisar wrote: 
We do not have a free society if a citizen is put to the choice, to cite but three 
examples, of, one, foregoing use of the phone or having the police record all the numbers 
he dials, or, two, foregoing use of the postal service or having the police collect the names 
and addresses of a!l his correspondents, or, three, foregoing use of banks or providing the 
police with access to an enormous quantity of highly personal data. We are talking 
about unrestrained access to data. 
A third line of cases involves the broad interpretation of the scope of warrantless searches, the 
subject of this Article. 
156 If the Court were to follow the Belton lead and reverse Chadwick and Sanders, eliminat-
ing the applicability of the Chzinel-cohtrol test as a limitation upon the scope of searches 
incident to arrests in public places, the question undoubtedly would arise whether C!uind 
should even be retained as a limitation upon searches incident to arrests that take place in 
homes. Justice Blackmun, who most consistently has argued against the applicability of the 
Chzind standard to public arrests, has specifically indicated that different concerns apply 
when the arrest takes place in a home. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 20 n.l 
(1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is also unlikely that Chrisman would serve as the basis for 
overruling Cluinel, as the majority never seemed able to get beyond the point that the arrest-
ing officer had the right to be inside the room at the elbow of the arrestee, rather than serving 
as the basis fo1 a wide-1anging sea:rch once inside room or home. Moreover, the decisions in 
Pa)'ton, 445 U.S. at 573, and Steagald, 451 U.S. at 204, clearly evidence this Court's intent to 
treat invasions of homes far differently from intrusions that occur in public places. 
Some exception may be taken to the use of Belton here as the basis for extension of the 
scope of searches incident to arrests that occur in public. Although search incident to arrest 
provided the theory on which the majority allowed a search of the interior compartment of 
the vehicle and all containers .found in that compartment, the Belton majority was over-
whelmed by the fact that the site of the search was an automobile, a factor of great impor-
tance for this Court. At least one commentator has suggested that the Court may dispense 
with the Belton bright-line rule now that Robbins has been overruled, and a search of the entire 
car and all containers is permissible under the automobile exception. See Kamisar, supra note 
85. 
On the other hand, this author does not see the Court letting go of Belton, even though 
Justice Stevens would like to see that decision reversed, because Belton and Ross serve law 
enforcement interests differently and the Court is unlikely to deny police the authority to 
conduct automobile searches permissible under Bdton but impermissible under Ross where 
probable cause would not support a search of the vehicle. 
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v. A PUBLIC PLACE-PROBABLE CAUSE EXCEPTION 
Among Justice Marshall's arguments in his Ross dissent is the con-
tention that the decision "takes a first step toward an unprecedented 
'probable cause' exception to the warrant requirement. " 157 At the out-
set it is imperative to note that Justice Stevens did not advocate such an 
exception; in fact he took great pains in Ross to fit the result within a 
"well-established" exception. 158 Moreover, when given the opportunity 
to approve the probable cause exception in Unz.ted States v. ChadwzCk, 159 
the Court unanimously rejected it. 16° Finally, nothing in Ross makes 
inexorable the development of such an exception. Nevertheless, various 
aspects of the reasoning in Ross lend credence to Justice Marshall's 
complaint. 
The facile manner in which the majority expanded the automobile 
exception indicates that the exception, which is "well-established" be-
cause it was formally recognized in 1925, 161 provided a handy tool to 
reach the desired result rather than an analytical framework which dic-
tated that result. The Court's difficulty in agreeing upon a rationale for 
the automobile exception evokes suspicion that its growth may not be 
completed. The Court was evidently self-conscious about the seeming 
anomaly between its treatment of the hidden recesses of a vehicle and 
containers found in the same automobile. The Ross concurring opinions 
herald the decision as an end to the confusion. 162 But as the Court ad-
dresses subsequent fourth amendment cases, the same confusion will 
arise concerning packages found in a vehicle and those seized elsewhere 
in public. At that time, a Court might elect to end the confusion by 
finding within Ross the foundation for a public place-probable cause 
exception. 163 
The public place-probable cause exception originally surfaced in 
Chadwick with a search that fell between the fine lines separating the 
automobile exception and searches incident to arrest. 164 Railroad per-
sonnel in San Diego first became suspicious when they noticed two men, 
157 102 S. Ct. at 2174. 
!58 /d. at 2172. 
159 433 u.s. 1 (1977). 
160 &e infta notes 164-176 and accompanying text; su also LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in 
an Impi!rflct World: On Drawing "Bn'ght Linu" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 315 
n.50 (1982). 
161 102 S. Ct. at 2162-63; m Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925). 
162 102 S. Ct. at 2173 (Blackmun, J., and Powell, J., concurring). 
163 It may be that once the Court recognizes that there is no meaning to its use of impracti-
cability, it will unabashedly recognize that once it departed from the mobility factor, it was 
operating·, beginning with Chambi!Ts, under a public place exception to justify the search of 
automobiles. &e Kamisar, supra note 85. 
164 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
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who matched a profile used to spot drug traffickers, load an unusually 
heavy footlocker onto a Boston-bound train. 165 The railroad officials 
notified federal authorities after they observed talcum powder, a sub--
stance often used to mask the odor of marijuana and hashish, leaking 
from the trunk. A description of the two defendants and the footlocker 
was radioed to federal agents in Boston, who, along with a police dog 
trained to detect marijuana, met the train at its destination. 166 After the 
defendants reclai.med the-footlocker and while they were sitting on it, 
the police dog was released near the footlocker. Without triggering the 
defendants' attention, the dog acted in a manner to suggest to the agents 
that the footlocker contained a controlled substance. Thereafter, the 
two defendants and .a porter moved the footlocker outside where the 
three lifted it and placed it into the trunk of a waiting confederate's 
car. 167 The agents moved in and arrested the two travelers and their 
confederate while the trunk Of the car was still open and before the car 
had been started. They also seized the footlocker and found the keys to 
the footlocker on one of the defendarits. 168 The defendants and foot-
locker were removed to the federal building where, an hour and a half 
later, with neither a warrant nor the defendant's consent, the footlocker 
was opened, revealing a large quantity of marijuana. 169 
The government offered as justification for the warrantless search 
the authority recognized under. both. the automobile exception and 
search incident to arrest. 170 Recognizing that the facts of their case did 
not squarely lie under either alternative, the government suggested in-
stead that a warrant is necessary only for intrusions which implicate the 
historically essential purpose.s of the fourth amendment. 171 This theory 
would confine the warrant requirement to the core subjects of fourth 
amendment protection: homes, offices and private communications. 
Consequently, the reasonableness of a search of personal effects seized 
outside of the home would turn only on the existence of probable cause 
to support the search. 172 In order to consider this position, however, the 
Court was forced to reexamine its adherence to the principle "that the 
police must, whenever practicable, obtain judicial approval of searches 
and seizures .... " 173 
The Court in Chadwick was not prepared for such a direct assault 
165 !d. at 3. 
166 !d. 
167 !d. at 4. 
168 !d. 
169 !d. at 4-5. 
170 Jd. at 11-12, 14. 
171Jd.at6. 
172 Cj. W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, at 5-6; LaFave, supra note 160, at nn. 4 7-50. 
173 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
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upon its stated preference for a warrant and the Chief Justice's majority 
opinion dismissed the broad proposition, citing to the language of the 
amendment as well as its history. The Court acknowledged the "strong 
historical connection" 174 between the warrant clause and the initial 
clause of the amendment which protects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures of effects as well as persons, houses and papers. It further 
noted the absence of evidence that the framers had intended to exclude 
from the protectipn all searches conducted outside the home. The war-
rant clause itself makes no distinction between-searches of private homes 
and other searches. In Chadwzdc, 175 the Court held that law enforcement 
officers, having probable cause to believe that the suspect footlocker 
contained a controlled substance, could legitimately seize and safeguard 
the container without a warrant, but could not search the container un-
til a warrant was obtained. Thus, the Court minimized the warrantless 
intrusion without compromising legitima.te law enforcement 
objectives. 176 
In Arlcansas v. Sanders, 177 the Court extended its Chadwick holding to 
a suitcase seized from a taxicab. The police stopped the taxicab in 
which the defendant was riding, although they had had sufficient prob-
able cause to seize the suitcase prior to the cab's departure from the 
airport terminal. 178 With a broad stroke, the Court rejected an ap-
proach which distinguished between searching luggage in a vehicle 
where there is probable cause to search the entire vehicle and a search in 
which probable cause focused upon the container prior to its being 
placed in the automobile. The Court held that "the warrant require-
ment . . . applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the 
same degree it applies to such luggage in other locations." 179 
174 433 U.S. at 8. 
175 !d. at I. 
176 Prior decisions of the Court illustrate the understanding that the warrant clause was 
not intended to have the narrow limits the government suggested. See, e.g., United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at II & n.6. Even the dissenters in Chadwick labeled the government's 
argument "an extreme view of the Fourth Amendment," id. at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 
but would have upheld the search as incident to arrest; they advocated an alternative rule 
which would permit the warrantless search of "any movable property in the possession of a 
person properly arrested in a public place." !d. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although 
Justice Blackmun labeled the government's position as extreme, in relation to his own propo-
sal, the exception the government offered was extreme only in that it would recognize and 
require creation of a new exception. On the other hand, while Justice Blackmun's sofution 
fits within an established exception-incident to arrest-it would eliminate not only the war-
rant requirement but the probable cause requirement, as well, antecedent to a search for 
evidence. It would also extend the warrant exemption fashioned later in Bdton to include as 
incident to arrest a search of the trunk of the vehicle and all property found in the trunk. 
177 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
178 !d. at 761. 
1 79 !d. at 766. 
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As a result of Ross, the broad proposition stated in Sanders no longer 
applies; however, Justice Stevens explicitly affirmed support for thenar-
row holding in Sanders though he rejected its reasoning. 18° Conse-
quently, the propositions of Sanders and Ross together hold that the 
warrant requirement does not apply to containers taken from 
automobiles unless there is probable cause to search the container before 
it is placed in the automobile. 
In the earlier cases ·arChadivzck, Sanders and Robbzns the Court fo-
cused upon the privacy interest in the container to be searched. Justice 
Powell argued that the size, construction and effort at sealing of certain 
containers entitled them to greater fourth amendment protection than 
others and that a warrant must be obtained before these containers are 
searched. 181 The remainder of the Court refused to allow the outcome 
to turn on the worthiness or unworthiness of a particular container. 182 
In Robbzns, Justice Stewart maintained that once an object is placed in a 
closed, opaque container it is fully protected by the fourth amend-
ment, 183 and Justice Stevens did not disagree with this aspect of the 
Robbzns decision.l84 
The Ross Court shifted the focus of the inquiry from the particular 
object searched to the place searched. 185 The Court pointed to the di-
minished expectation of privacy of one whose home is searched under a 
warrant. As a result of this diminished expectation, any receptacle that 
may contain the searched-for items may be opened without a separate 
analysis of the privacy interest in the container. In Ross, the Court held 
that the search which is justified by a warrant, as well as the search 
which is justified un,der the automobile exception, destroys any privacy 
interest in the place to be searched. 186 Consequently, any container 
which falls within the warrant or the automobile exception may be 
opened and searched. 
The impact of the Ross rule becomes apparent with its application 
to related fourth amendment issues. Situations which appear logically 
indistinguishable take on varying fourth amendment significance. Con-
sider the problem arising after Ross when police receive a tip from a 
reliable, confidential informant 187 that he just returned from a house 
where he purchased narcotics from a supplier identified as Bandit, 
whose full ciescription and address are provided by the informant. The 
180 United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2172. 
181 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442U.S. at 764 n.13. 
182 United States v. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 44 7 (Stevens, J, dissenting). 
183 /d. at 428. 
184 /d. at 449 n.9. 
185 United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2170-71. 
186 /d. at 21 71. 
187 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
l 
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informant also tells police that Bandit advised him that he would be 
leaving the area within the hour because it was getting "too hot," taking 
with him his remaining, large quantity of narcotics. 188 Whether police 
need a warrant to search for those narcotics when they apprehend Ban-
dit may depend upon relatively insignificant factors. If police arrive 
and apprehend Bandit on the street, carrying a footlocker, after he has 
left his house, Chadwz"clc dictates that the officers may seize the footlocker 
but that they must· obtain a warrant before they may search it. 189 
A different result obtains if Bandit is apprehended just as he drives 
out of his driveway onto the street. Since the police have probable cause 
to believe that he is transporting narcotics in the car, they may conduct 
a warrantless sea~ch of the vehicle, and Ross would permit the police to 
open and search the footlocker which they will find stored in the trunk 
of the automobile. 190 Obviously, the difference in results occurs be-
cause, in one case, the footlocker was found in an automobile and, in the 
other, it was not; automobiles are, by the Court's definition, different 
and subject to one of the "'few,' 'specifically established,' and 'well-de-
lineated' " exceptions. 19 1 
A third possibility could arise if the informant advises the officers 
that Bandit will transport the narcotics in a footlocker, and the footlock-
er is seized by the officers when they search the vehicle that he is driving. 
Under the .Ross endorsement of the holding in Sanders, if probable cause 
focused specifically on the footlocker prior to its placement in the vehi-
cle, a warrant remains a prerequisite to the search of the container. 192 
If the court intends, as it said it did, to preserve the Sanders holding, 
the footlocker in this example would be comparable to one seized on the 
street, and treated differently from Ross, even though it was actually 
seized from a moving car which was lawfully stopped and searched. 
However, if the police did not observe Bandit place the footlocker in the 
automobile, or if the informant neither saw it placed in the vehicle nor 
advised police that Bandit would leave by car, the reasoning in Ross 
may dictate a different result. It is possible that the Court will confine 
Sanders to those situations where the police had probable cause and an 
opportunity to seize the container before it was placed in the vehicle and 
waited only in order to exploit the automobile exception. If this two-
pronged test were read into Sanders, the Court would uphold the search 
188 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
189 This is close to the fact situation in Chadwick, 443 U.S. I, with regard to the footlocker 
in that case. 
190 The result is dictated by Ross, I 02 S. Ct. 215 7. 
191 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 423 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357). 
192 The Court endorsed this specific holding of Sandas in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 
at 2172. 
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in this third hypothetical since the police did not have the opportunity 
to seize the footlocker before it was placed in the trunk of the 
automobile. 
The facial absurdities of the results in these cases will create within 
the Court the same internal pressure for a sense of order that led it to the 
decision in Ross. After all, the law after the decision in Robbz"ns distin-
guishing a vehicle from its contents was clear enough. The only ques-
tion remaining at that time was whether the protection applied to all 
opaque containers. The rule following the decision in Ross distinguish-
ing contain~rs found in a vehicle from those seized in other public places 
is as clear. The remaining questions will require the Court to draw a 
line between containers placed in a vehicle after probable cause has fo-
cused on the package and those containers found in a vehicle where the 
probable cause focused upon the automobile and not upon the particu-
lar package. The gray areas between the two rules are ·bound to create 
difficulty. · 
As the Court enters the gray areas, the warrant requirement will 
hang in the balance. Least attractive to the Burger Court is an ap-
proach that would require reconsideration of the automobile exception 
itself. Such an examination should result inevitably in restoration of the 
limited Carroll exception which restricted waiver of a warrant to those 
few and unique situations where the mobility of the vehicle creates an 
actual necessity for immediate search. 193 Such an approach would re-
verse the Court's clear trend toward minimizing the necessity for a war-
rant to conduct searches in public areas. It would also require the Court 
to acknowledge that the rationales offered in support of the automobile 
exception in the line of cases from Chambers to Ross were fashioned of 
whole cloth. 
A second approach would expand the scope of warrantless searches 
by applying the principles of search incident to arrest and deemphasize 
the dependence upon the automobile exception as the basis for an ex-
emption. Support for this alternative was advanced by the dissenters in 
Chadwzdc, where Justice Blackmun suggested "that a warrant is not re-
quired to seize and search any movable property in the possession of a 
person properly arrested in a public place." 194 The dissent acknowl-
edged that the fact of arrest does not necessarily obviate the privacy 
interest of the arrestee in the objects in his possession at the time of the 
arrest. It also conceded that impoundment pending issuance of a search 
warrant protects the privacy interest remaining in those objects. But 
Justice Blackmun offered several reasons why a search warrant is irrele-
193 See Grano, Rethinking the Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 645-46 ( 1982). 
194 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 19. (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
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vant following a lawful arrest in public and why it should be unneces-
sary to impound the container sought to be searched. He asserted that 
search warrants in such situations are routinely forthcoming. 195 Fur-
ther; he contended that a bright-line rule would end the irrational dis-
tinction between a person carrying a wallet and one carrying a 
footlocker. 196 
According to Justice Blackmun, there are no strong policy argu-
ments in favor of requiring a se~rch warrant following a lawful arrest in 
publi~ because the "formality of obtaining a warrant" has "little practi-
cal effect ·in protecting Fourth Amendment values." 197 Justice Black-
mun's proposal involves a thorough rethinking of the holding in Chzme!, 
perhaps limiting Chzme! to its facts. At least for public arrests, however, 
it would formally constitute the death of any required nexus between 
the scope of incidental searches and the underlying reasons which justify 
that exemption· from the warrant requirement. 
The Court took the first step toward such a rule when it upheld the 
search of the vehicle in Belton as incident to arrest, absent any conceiv-
able argument that the search was necessary either to protect the arrest-
ing officer or to prevent destruction of evidence within the arrestees' 
reach. While Justice Stevens in Ross exhibited sensitivity to the argu-
ment that requiring a search warrant is not necessarily desirable when it 
offers "relatively minor protection ... for privacy interests," 198 the 
Blackmun approach would undoubtedly meet Justice Stevens' opposi-
tion for the same reasons that he opposed the bright-line rule advanced 
by the majority in Belton. Although Justice Blackmun has suggested 
that search warrants are routinely forthcoming to authorize the search 
of packages seized following a lawful arrest in public, 199 his approach 
does not require a determination that probable cause existed to justify 
the search of movable property in the possession of a person lawfully 
arrested in a public place. 
According to Justice Blackmun, whether or not a search warrant 
could be issued following an arrest, the authority to search anything not 
bolted down would flow automatically from the probable cause which 
gave rise to the author:ity to arrest. As a result, such a rule would extend 
the scope of the search of the automobile in cases like Belton to the trunk 
of the vehicle because the Blackmun proposal eliminates the Chzmel-
control test as a limitation upon searches incident to public arrests. It 
would disregard the Ross majority's explicit endorsement of the require-
195 ld. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
196 Jd. at 20-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
197 ld. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
198 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9. 
199 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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ment that the search of an automobile and its contents remains depen-
dent upon the existence of independent probable cause to support the 
search of the vehicle. 
The third approach involves recognition of the automobile excep-
tion as a "well-established" anomaly permitting distinctions to be made 
between automobiles and their contents on the one hand and, on the 
other, receptacles which are seized elsewhere in public places. Accord-
ingly, the automobile is exempted from the protection of the warrant 
requirement primarily because the exemption is so "well-established." 
It is submitted that the anomalous character of the exception will once 
again lead to anomalous treatment of each new case. Consequently, any 
factual situation that does not fall squarely within the automobile ex-
ception or the rule provided by Chadwz'ck and the narrow Sanders holding 
must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The automobil~ exception will 
rest, then, squarely and solely upon its venerable age, and the Court will 
be relieved of the frustrating task of creating new rationales or resur-
recting old ones to justify the exception's existence. 
The very unsatisfactory nature of this explanation leads directly to 
the fourth approach, a public place-probable cause exception to the 
warrant requirement. Justice Marshall warned of this potential devel-
opment in his Ross dissent. 200 Such a development is not inevitable and 
is, at least, partially dependent upon the unwillingness of the Court to 
accept the longevity of the ·automobile exception as the sole justification 
for its continued existence. An attempt to explain why it is impractica-
ble to obtain a warrant to search an immobilized vehicle, especially one 
that has been removed to the security of police headquarters, inexorably 
leads to the conclusion that obtaining a warrant is no less impracticable 
for any object that is not nailed down. The Court refused to limit the 
automobile exception to those instances in which application for a war-
rant is demonstrably impracticable. It is generally just as impracticable, 
however, to seek warrants for other movable objects found in public 
places. 201 Ultimately, only thelegal fiction surrounding automobiles al-
lows police to conduct warrantless searches of containers found in vehi-
cles but requires a warrant when the container is seized elsewhere. 
Although the Ross majority discounted the importance of the di-
minished expectaton of privacy in the automobile as the justification for 
the automobile exception, the privacy argument lurks in the back-
ground. Once it is aclmowledged that the impracticability supporting 
the automobile exception is no less applicable to any container discov-
200 102 S. Ct. at 2174. 
201 Sa United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that it is difficult to believe that any police force cannot either tow or otherwise 
maintain control over a car while a warrant is being sought). 
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ered in a public place, the privacy argument can be made again. The 
privacy interest in a suitcase or other object carried in public is no 
greater than the privacy interest in the same object when it is stored in 
the trunk of an automobile. A realistic appraisal of the comparative 
privacy interests can lead to the reasonable conclusion that an object 
carried iri public is entitled to even less protection th~n if the object had 
been stored in the locked trunk of a vehicle. 202 Just as the expectation of 
privacy in containers stored in the trunk of a car "may not survive if 
probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contra-
band,"203 it will be argued that the expectation of privacy in property 
found in other public places should also give way if there is probable 
cause to believe that it contains contraband. 
Adoption of this argument involves acceptance of the position ad-
vanced by the government in Chadwick, that the protection of the war-
rant clause should be limited to homes, offices and private 
communications. 204 The line of automobile exception cases from Cham-
bers to Ross, as well as Belton and Chrisman, indicates that this Court no 
longer believes that warrantless searches should be exceptional. All of 
these cases seek to eliminate the alleged frustration imposed on law en-
forcement agencies by the "judicially-created preference for a war-
rant,"205 without any empirical evidence of the burdens that the 
warrant requirement imposes. The Court has adopted bright-line rules 
relaxing the warrant requirement, which imposed no great burden or 
inconvenience upon police nor frustrated legitimate law enforcement 
objectives in the overwhelming number of situations. 
The Ross decision need not evolve into a public place-probable 
cause exception to the warrant requirement. The primary obstacle to 
recognition of this broad new exception out of the automobile exception 
202 The presence of the suitcase carried in public is immediately known to the prying eyes 
of one who would do it mischief, and it is more likely to be lost or fall and break open than a 
suitcase stored in the trunk of an automobile. 
203 Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2171. 
204 This would involve repudiating the broad principles enunciated in United States v. 
Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and limiting the holding in that case to its facts. But the Court 
already minimized the privacy rationale in the automobile cases decided between Katz and 
Ross, permitting warrantless searches because of a diminished privacy interest in automobiles. 
Moreover, in Ross itself, the Court allowed the warrantless search on the basis of impractica-
bility despite the Court's recognition of an expectation of privacy in an automobile and its 
contents. The Katz rationale was dependent upon the Court's perception of the per se imper-
missibility of warrantless searches absent exigent circumstances and was advanced by a Court 
that firmly believed that the scope of warrantless searches must be linked to the necessity 
which gave i-ise to the exception. The Court's continuing adherence to those principles can-
not be measured simply by whether the Court continues to quote from the language in Katz. 
That commitment must be considered in light of the Court's developing attitude towards the 
warrant requirement. 
205 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 438 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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is that the latter is "well-established," and the Court has been reluctant 
to create entirely new exceptions. But the Court appears much firmer 
now in its belief that there is little valuable difference between the 
checks upon a search conducted with a warrant and one conducted 
without. To be sure, the Court continues to discuss the importance and 
value of a warrant, but, in light of these decisions, such words ring 
hollow. The creation of a public place exception seems altogether possi-
ble given the groundwork now in place. 
